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THE NAVY AND Low FREQUENCY ACrIVE SONAR:
STRIPPING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF ITS
AUTHORITY
NATE CIHLAR"
For over two decades,' the United States Navy has been developing a
new technology called Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low
Frequency Active Sonar ("LFAS"), designed for the detection of enemy
submarines.2 In order for LFAS to be successful, it must emit low frequency
sounds3 that are potentially damaging to the habitat and survival of many
endangered species.' Reports have claimed that these species, in particular
the humpback and sperm whales, behave erratically whenever the Navy
conducts system testing;' some opponents even blame the sonar for directly
"The author is a J.D. candidate attending the College of William and Mary School of Law.
He received a B.S. in Finance and Marketing from Georgetown University in 1999. He
would like to thank the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review staff for
all their support and assistance. He would also like to thank his brother Chris, without whose
support he would have never pursued law at William and Mary.
'According to Lanny Sinkin, an attorney who has represented several parties, including the
Hawaii County Green Party, over the past decade in litigation against the Navy and its use
of Low Frequency Active Sonar ("LFAS"), the initial development of the LFAS system
began as early as 1980. Lanny Sinkin, Comments of Lanny Sinkin on National Marine
Fisheries Service ProposedRule, Docket No. 990927266-0240-02, ID. 072699A, Taking and
Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental To Navy Operations of
Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System, Low Frequency Active Sonar, at § 2.0, available
at http://www.manyrooms.com/conmentslanny.htm (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter Sinkin,
Comments on NMFS Rule].
2 Defenders of Wildlife, LFA Sonar: A Deadly Technology, at http://www.defenders.org/
wildlife/new/marine/whales/sonar.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
' "Sound waves can differ in wavelength, intensity, and frequency (measured in cycles per
second or Hertz). The lower the frequency of a sound, the farther it can travel in the ocean.
Sound of frequencies below 1000 Hertz (Hz) is often referred to as low-frequency sound."
Elena M. McCarthy, International Regulation of Transboundary Pollutants: the Emerging
Challenge of Ocean Noise, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 257, 262 (2001).
4 Unfortunately, these low levels of sonar may be interfering with animals who use sound for
"navigat[ion], finding food, staying with other members of one's species, and reproduction
.. " Greenpeace Found. Campaign, LFA/Ocean Environment Campaign, at http://www.
greenpeacefoundation.comlaction/canpinfo.cfin?canpilD= 18 (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
' See generally Larry Sinkin, United States Navy Testing of Low Frequency Active Sonar on
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causing the whales to beach themselves.6 Environmentalists continue to
argue that LFAS's interference with the whales' habitat amounts to taking
them by "harm," in violation of the takings clause of the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").7 Since humpback and sperm whales are federally protected,
ESA holds that federal funds cannot legally be used to "harm" these
animals.8
I. BACKGROUND
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s,9 evidence accumulated showing
that the Navy was developing LFAS without the initial required scientific
testing outlined by ESA. 0 Further allegations claimed the existence of ample
evidence that a taking had already occurred. If valid, this evidence should
have the requisite authority to force the Navy to apply for an incidental take
permit in order to continue the implementation of the system."
The proposed illegal conduct by the Navy created a precarious situation:
either force the Navy to complete an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") through preliminary tests, even after years of development, or allow
the Navy to avoid the testing altogether. If an EIS were completed and testing
uncovered a scientifically proven link between LFAS and the death of the
endangered species, ESA could require a complete halt to LFAS develop-
Humpback Whales and OtherBeings OfftheIslandofHawaii: Facts and Policy Issues (Apr.
16, 1998), available athttp://www.ilhawaii.net/-light/report3.html [hereinafter Sinkin, Facts
and Policy Issues].
6 For a full list of possible effects on marine mammals from LFAS, see MARINE MAMMAL
COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS at 168-69 (1997). Some of the effects found are: "death from ... trauma,"
"hearing loss," "disruption of feeding,... nursing, ... communication and sensing," and
"stress, [which makes] animals more vulnerable to disease... and predation. .. ." Id. at 169.
7 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C) (2000) (prohibiting the taking of
endangered species on the high seas).
8 Congress states in ESA that "the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction .... ." 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(4) (2000).
' See generally Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1 (discussing the Navy's
testing program).
Before beginning the development of any government project that may have detrimental
effects on endangered species, ESA requires the Navy to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"). 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
" The Secretary of the Interior may permit any taking that "is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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ment;12 a costly decision, since the Navy may have spent three hundred and
fifty million dollars on LFAS thus far. 3 If the Navy, however, is not sub-
jected to the laws of ESA and avoids the preliminary testing, the decision
would virtually eliminate ESA's authority.
Although the Navy began development without following ESA
procedures, mounting pressure led the Nav to agree to conduct preliminary
tests before full implementation of LFAS. 4 Once the tests were complete,
allegations arose that the Navy used imprecise procedures during testing and
that there were discrepancies with the end results. 5 Over the past eight years,
the Navy's use of LFAS has gained national and even international exposure,
and has caused environmentalists to continually argue for ESA guidelines to
be followed.'6 The power to stop government agencies, especially the military,
from taking endangered species and to require them to follow the guidelines
set forth by ESA could ultimately be determined by the decisions made
regarding the LFAS controversy.
A. "hat is LFAS?
The Navy has used sonar for decades to search for enemy submarines, 7
"but it has relied primarily on passive sonars, which use sensitive micro-
2 This is especially true because once a taking has been proven, incidental permits are very
difficult to acquire and the EIS testing can take over a year to process before being granted.
7 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY & MARINE CORPS,
2000-2035: BECOMING A 21ST-CENTURY FORCE; UNDERSEA WARFARE, app. D (1997),
available at http://www.nap.edu/htmi/tech_21 st/uwindex.htn.
" This is the amount the environmental group, Hawaii County Green Party, claims the Navy
has spent. Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1198 (D. Haw.
2000).
14 The Navy began the formal testing required by ESA in 1995 after "a scientist discovered
the planned deployment of the system and alerted the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC)." Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5. Since the formal testing began,
national attention has continued to grow. See generally id.
" See generally Ocean Mammal Inst., US Navy's Misinformation to Congress about LFA
(Low Frequency Active) Sonar, at http://www.oceanmanmnalinst.org/lfa-navy.html (last
modified June 7, 2000) (critiquing the Navy's reponse to Congressional inquiries about the
use of LFAS).
6 See generally Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5 (discussing the various forms
of response the news of the testing has provoked).
"7 In 1906, "Lewis Nixon invented the very first [s]onar type listening device," and ten years
later, "[i]n 1915, Paul Lang~vin invented the first sonar type device for detecting submarines
.... By 1918, both Britain and the U.S. had [instituted active sonar] ... ." Mary Bellis, The
History of Sonar, at http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blsonar.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2003).
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phones to pick up the sound of distant ships.""8 In contrast, LFAS emits a
volatile low frequency sound. 9 These active sonar sounds are produced by
massive speakers at sound levels reaching two hundred and forty decibels.20
"To put this sound in perspective, consider that the sound of a jet engine
from 100 feet away is 130 decibels; exposure to any sound above 140
decibels causes immediate hearing damage in humans; and a sound of 160
decibels would instantly puncture your eardrums[.]"'
The purpose and design of LFAS is to detect solid objects in the ocean
by creating an echo upon impact.22 Navy ships monitor these echoes,
determining whether each came from an enemy submarine.23 The major
advantage to low frequency sonar is its ability to travel much farther than
other higher frequency noises.24 The Navy uses this advantage by "'lighting
up' the deep sea with reflected sound" dispersed over wide stretches of ocean
from individual speakers.25 The Navy's ultimate plan is to deploy this system
in over eighty percent of the earth's oceans,26 making it impossible for
federally protected endangered species, including humpback and sperm
whales,27 to avoid encounters with the sonar.
IS Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 2.
,9 See id.
Sound is a form of mechanical energy. It is a vibration that travels as a
wave in a fluid. While the ocean is basically opaque to light, it is
comparatively transparent to sound. The ocean is an especially effective
medium for transmitting sound-of all forms of known radiation, sound
travels through the sea the best.
McCarthy, supra note 3, at 26.
20 Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 2. "The decibel (dB) is the [measuring] unit [that]
compare[s] different quantities of sound, usually intensity and power." The scale it uses
provides different levels and "expresses sounds logarithmically, so the difference between
180 and 190 dB is not 10, but 10 times." McCarthy, supra note 3, at 262.
2 Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 2.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 McCarthy, supra note 3, at 262.
2 Greenpeace Found. Campaign, supra note 4.
26 Lanny & Mary Rose Sinkin, LFAS: The Last Sound You Hear, Sea Shepherd Log, Summer
1998, at 3, available at http://www.seashepherd.org.issues/habitat/sscslognoise.html.27 ESA published lists of endangered animals and plants in 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12. Both
the humpback and sperm whales were listed as endangered species on June 2, 1970. 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (2002).
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B. Endangered Species Act
Ever since the passage of ESA 28 in 1973, critics have speculated about
a need for change and have continually proposed more developed legi-
slation.29 Even with all the intimations that legislation needs to create laws
that clarify the protection given to endangered species, "the Act stands as the
United States' best effort to date at preserving the country's biological
diversity."3 Congress passed ESA in order to ensure that industrialization by
humans does not impede on the rights of other species.31 The Act does not
consider the worth of the species it sets out to protect, but protects each
species for its own benefit rather than for the benefit of humans. 2 Congress
passed the Act recognizing that endangered "species of fish, wildlife, and
plants are of [a]esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people., 33 Essentially, it is Congress'
2 Congress enacted ESA to strengthen protection of endangered plants and animals. The Act
combined United States species lists with foreign lists and applied uniform provisions,
categorized species as "threatened" or "endangered," required all agencies to employ policies
for conservation of the listed species and enacted broad takings prohibitions. Fish & Wildlife
Service, History and Evolution of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Including Its
Relationship to CITES, at http://endangered.fws.gov/esasunthtml (last modified Oct. 1996).
29See Jeff Curtis & Bob Davison, The Endangered Species Act: 30 Years on the Ark, OPEN
SPACES QUARTERLY, Jan. 2003, at 8, 19, available at http://www.open-spaces.com/article-
v5n3-davison.php ("[O]ur commitment to species conservation must go beyond the ESA.
Precious few species have been recovered, and the ESA has often succeeded in maintaining
species and their habitat only at threshold [sic] levels."). But see Michael S. Coffman, The
Problem with the Endangered Species Act, NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM, Aug. 2, 2003, at para.
13, at http://www.newswithviews.com/Coffinan/mike2.htin ("Federal environmental
regulations like the ESA have destroyed the lives on tens of thousands of people, closed
entire communities, and confiscated hundreds of millions (if not billions) of dollars of private
property . .. ."). See generally Susan Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic
Megafauna: A4 Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463 (1999)
(exploring the history and amendments of the Endangered Species Act). Many current
problems facing ESA were unforseen, such as threatened extinctions, when Congress drafted
ESA in 1973. Id. at 482-83. These unforseen problems have made the ESA much more
difficult to enforce and a lot more costly. Id. at 482-84.
'
0 Ray Vaughan, Proof of "Prohibited Takings" Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 AM.
JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 421, 425 (1994).
3 ESA's purpose is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved .... ." 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (2000).
32 Vaughan, supra note 30, at 425.
13 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(3).
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policy that all federal agencies are responsible for their actions toward
endangered species, and each agency must attempt to conserve the species
listed.34
II. THE TAKING CLAUSE
Section 9 of ESA provides the "takings clause." The clause makes it
unlawful for any person subject to American laws to "take any [endangered]
species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States" 35
or to "take any such species upon the high seas .... " It further defines
"take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."'3" The recent tech-
nological advancement of LFAS has brought the ESA takings clause back
into heavy litigation with rampant questions concerning its breadth. This has
left environmentalists with two primary approaches for pleading their case.
A. Option 1: Direct Killing
The first option is to prove that LFAS is directly "killing" the
endangered species. In the waters surrounding recent Navy sonar use, there
have been reports of whale deaths from internal bleeding. 38 Environ-
mentalists argue that LFAS can cause "great damage to the immune system
with injuries similar to being microwaved."'39 It is clear from the plain
language of ESA's definition of "taking" that if the LFAS system is causing
this internal bleeding and direct death, the Navy would be in violation of the
takings clause.4° Ultimately, the Navy would need either a valid incidental
take permit or to be granted an exemption to the rule in order to continue
34 Sabrina C.C. Fedel, A Cause ofAction for "Taking" of Wildlife Under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 13 CAUSES OF ACTION 273, 281 (1999).
3" Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000).
36 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C).
11 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).38 One ofthe most recent was in March of 2000. Various beaked whale species were stranded
and beached immediately following the passing of a naval fleet using mid-range sonar off
the coast ofthe Bahamas. Ocean Def. Int'l, LFA Sonar-The U.S. Navy's Plan to KillMarine
Mammals, at http://www.oceandefense.org/lfa.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).39 /d.
40 Since the takings clause specifically defines killing as a taking, a direct link to death would
be nearly impossible to refute. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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with the implementation ofthe system. There is, however, one major obstacle
confronting environmentalists in their attempt to argue that the Navy is
"taking" whales through direct killing-proof
"Scientists have only scratched the surface in their understanding of
how sounds are used by well-known animals; and for animals less studied the
questions have not yet even been asked."' Additionally, although there
seems to be circumstantial evidence supporting the proposition that the sound
levels deployed by LFAS are causing injuries to the endangered animals, the
Navy has classified most of the hard evidence from testing, and it is
accordingly unavailable for independent scientific review.42 Therefore, even
if the testing of LFAS resulted in hundreds of beached whales, scientists
would be unable to directly link the internal bleeding to the sonar,43 and the
Navy could always argue that other variables played a role in each animal's
untimely death."
Independent scientists would have little to fall back on without the
classified information,45 making it nearly impossible to satisfy standing in
order to bring a case. As a necessary element of standing, environmentalists
would have to demonstrate "injury in fact" and that the injury is "fairly
traceable" to the actions of the Navy.'
To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article
III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of
standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate
Greenpeace Found. Campaign, supra note 4.
42 Id; see also Ocean Def. Int'l, supra note 38, at para. 5.
4 It is very difficult to determine the effect that low frequency sonar has on animals because
"sound is multi-dimensional" and hard to measure. McCarthy, supra note 3, at 263. Many
factors need to be considered such as: "the intensity of the sound, its duration, frequency,
bandwidth, duty cycle, rise time, temporal structure, and the similarity of any ofthese factors
to biologically relevant sounds." Id.
"' There are many difficulties in predicting actual levels of sound received by an animal,
because "[s]everal environmental factors affect transmission loss in the ocean.. . ." Id.
"Overall noise in the ocean results from a combination of sources, some man-made (sonar,
ships' engines) and some natural (waves, wind, rain, ice)." Id. Ultimately, this leaves
scientists guessing just how much sound the whales are exposed to. See id.
4' To date, the significant literature written publicly about behavioral disturbance reactions
of marine mammals are anecdotal and only concerned with short-term behavioral reactions.
Few long-term studies are publicly available. Id. at 270.
4' Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1247 (1 th Cir.
1998) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).
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that he has suffered "injury in fact, " that the injury is 'fairly
traceable " to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.47
The scientific community does not have sufficient definitive evidence
to directly link internal bleeding with LFAS. 4 Circumstantial evidence
combined with conjectural statistics49 is unlikely to satisfy the requirement
for standing because the scope of the sonar is so vast (eighty percent of the
oceans) and so many other variables are present.5" Ultimately, it is difficult
to argue that the causal relationship is "fairly traceable" to the Navy if the
Navy emits the sonar throughout the entire ocean at once, or continues to
47 Id. (emphasis added).
"SARAH DOLMAN ET AL., WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION SOC'Y, OCEANS OF NOISE: A
WDCS SCIENCE REPORT 57 (Mark Simmonds et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.
wdes.org/dan/publishing.nsf/alweb/64543E9BBF9860D780256D2D00331176.
49 The International Whaling Commission's Standing Working Group on Environmental
Concerns has provided statistical information for beached whales that is hard to refute. See
id. at 39. The group
reported that 8/49 beaked whale strandings, and 6/6 multiple species
beaked whale strandings occurred with "military activities". [sic]... In
fact, the probability that 8/49 (or more) beaked whale strandings occurred
with military activities to be greater than p=0.05 (the usually accepted
level for rejection of a null hypothesis), military activity would have had
to occur more than 8.4% of the time, and for the probability that 6/6
multiple beaked whale strandings occurred with military activities to be
greater than p=0.05, military activity would have had to occur more than
60.7% of the time. The actual rate of military activities in any area is
probably nearer 0.1%. Thus, the number of strandings of beaked whales
with military activities is very unlikely to be a coincidence.
Id. (quoting Letter from Dr. Hal Whitehead, Killam Professor of Biology, Dalhousie
University, to Donna Wieting, Chief of Marine Mammal Conservation Division, National
Marine Fisheries Service (May 28, 2001)).
" See generally OceanLink, Causes of Oceanic Noise Pollution and Recommendations for
Reduction, at http://oceanlink.island.net/oceanmatters/noise%20pollution.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2004) (discussing a number of sources of undersea noise pollution besides sonar,
including large ships, boat traffic, acoustic thermometry, underwater exploration and mining,
and pingers and ringers, which have caused ambient ocean noise to rise ten decibels from
1950 to 1975); DOLMAN ET AL., supra note 48.
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only sporadically use the device, resulting in the beaching of only a handful
of whales at times distant from one another. 5' Environmentalists are left with
no hard evidence that the sonar is actually "killing" endangered species.
B. Option 2: Proof of "Harm"
Regardless of whether the LFAS system is directly killing the
endangered whales, the Navy could still be held responsible. The issue
becomes just how broadly ESA's takings clause should be read. Instead of
focusing on the word "kill" in the takings clause, environmentalists may be
best served by focusing on the interpretation of the word "harm."
When interpreting the plain meaning of the word "harm," one must
consider that it "gathers meaning from the words around it."'52 In the context
of the takings clause, Congress meant for "harm" to stand for a particular
meaning different from the meanings of other categorical listings." This
different interpretation ultimately includes "indirectly injuring endangered
animals through habitat modification....""
Even if LFAS is not "directly" responsible for a whale's death, the sonar
could be disturbing the habitat in which the animal lives by altering
reproductive activity, communication, and swimming patterns, among other
things." The Supreme Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon stated that harm "may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns .... ,5' Therefore,
"I Even though "standing is not defeated merely because the alleged injury can be fairly
traced to the actions of both parties and non-parties," many variables are found within the
ocean that could impact results. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1247 (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
52 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 702 (1995)
(quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
" Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702.
54 Id.
" See DOLMAN ETAL., supra note 48, at 53, 54 tbl.5.2.1 (listing possible impacts of noise on
cetaceans, including physical (auditory and non-auditory), perceptual, behavioral,
chronic/stress, and indirect effects). Decompression sickness is a new concern in cetaceans,
caused when "gas (principally nitrogren) comes out of solution, forming significant bubbles
that, in turn, can grow and make damaging 'holes' in tissues." Id. at 59. These gas bubbles
obstruct narrow blood circulation pathways and thus keep oxygen from reaching tissues. Id.
- Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
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one may conclude that the definition of "take" has been made broader
because "take" includes "harm" which includes "habitat modification." The
consequence of allowing the definition of "habitat modification" to include
injuries not "directly" responsible for the endangered species' deaths
ultimately ensures that "take" protect the species from indirect effects as
well.57
1. Breadth of "Habitat Modification"
In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court concluded that "significant habitat
modification or degradation that... kills or injures wildlife" is covered
under the "harm" portion of the takings clause.5" Consequently, one must
look even deeper and decide what constitutes sufficient habitat modification
to enforce the "harm" provision.
Sweet Home was a class action suit filed by several small landowners
and logging companies.59 The issue was whether or not people could interfere
with woods in the Pacific Northwest and Southeast that contained both the
red-cockaded woodpecker and the northern spotted owl.' The Court held that
interference was allowed so long as it did not result in a modification to the
woods that "actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."'
'
"The problem after Sweet Home is the ambiguity of the Court's holding
regarding the proof of causation of a habitat modification... "62 Since the
decision, disagreement emerged about the interpretation of the word
"actually." Commentators have argued that the word "actually" was used to
" See discussion supra at text accompanying note 53; see also Steven G. Davison, The
Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter: Modification of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking
in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 WM. & MARYENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 541,
582 (2003) ("Habitat modification may constitute a prohibited taking in violation ofthe ESA
either when the habitat modification directly kills or injures a particular protected animal or
when the habitat modification indirectly kills or injures a protected animal.").
" Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000)).
'9 Id. at 692.
o Id. The red-cockaded woodpecker has been listed as an endangered species since Oct. 13,
1970; the northern spotted owl is a threatened species, listed since June 26, 1990.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2002).
61 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
62 Brandon Jensen, Litigating the Crossroads between Sweet Home and Daubert, 24 VT. L.
REv. 169, 178 (1999).
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limit "harm that is hypothetical or conjectural, as opposed to harm that is
concrete and particularized. ' 63 Regardless, at a minimum, "[c]ourts thus far
appear content that the term 'actually' refers to the 'degree of certainty that
harm would befall' an endangered species as opposed to the 'timing of the
injury."'" Finding that "actually" was implemented to refer to a degree of
certainty, one can imply that in order to constitute a taking, the sonar does
not have to directly kill the animals, but must only lead to eventual death due
to a change in behavioral patterns. It seems that there must be a high degree
of certainty that the habitat modification will lead to a deadly change in
behavioral patterns. Some clarification has been provided by circuit courts
since the Sweet Home decision in establishing just what degree of harm is
necessary.
2. Necessary Degree: The Element of Imminence
In Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that a showing of "an imminent threat of future harm is sufficient for
the issuance of an injunction under the ESA."65 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's logging activity would constitute a take of marbled murrelets, a
protected nesting bird,66 in violation of ESA.67 Defendant argued that
evidence of a past harm is necessary for an injunction and that future harm
does not satisfy the "harm" requirement of the takings clause.68 The court
disagreed, finding that "[n]owhere does the re-definition of 'harm' or its
explanatory commentary require historic injury to protected wildlife. ' 69
Although historic injury7" is not required, Marbled Murrelet reaffirmed
63 Id. at 179.
Id. at 180 (quoting Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781,785
(9th Cir. 1995)).
' Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied.
6 The marbled murrelet was listed as a threatened species on Oct. 1, 1992. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11.
67 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1062.
"Id.
69 Id. at 1065 (quoting Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784). The new definition was issued by the
Secretary "because the Secretary was concerned that the old definition of 'harm' could be
read to mean habitat modification alone," so "the Secretary [therefore] inserted the phrase
'actually kills or injures wildlife."' Id. (quoting Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 784) (emphasis in
original).7
' Historic injury is synonymous with past injury. See id. ("To the extent the Sweet Home
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
that the level of proof needed for "habitat modification" includes im-
minence.71 Courts have allowed a certain amount of elasticity when dealing
with the definition of imminence, leading to a range of interpretations."
Nevertheless, imminence "cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is
to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article II
purposes-that the injury is 'certainly impending.""' This leads to necessary
evidentiary proof from the given facts of each case. "Where there is no actual
harm, however, its imminence (though not its precise extent) must be
established."'74
The issue for environmentalists once again becomes how to provide the
satisfactory level of evidence to prove imminence of harm from habitat
modification. Reaching the necessary level of proof, although much lower
than would be needed to show actual killing, will still be very difficult for
environmental groups because of the aforementioned lack of scientific
proof.75 The lack of proof is compounded by the fact that LFAS is a relatively
new technological advancement without much published information about
its development. Environmentalists do not have the available resources,
knowledge of the technology, or time before the Navy's implementation of
the system to prove its harmful effects. It seems that the only party that has
the resources available to solve whether there is a satisfactory level of
imminence of harm for a take is the Navy itself
opinion may be read to say past injury is required before an injunction may issue, such a
statement is dictum.").7 1 Id. at 1066. The Court found that the remainder of the Sweet Home decision did not intend
to alter previously settled case law. Therefore the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit decision in
Rosboro Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995),
which was decided three months prior to the Sweet Home decision. The Rosboro decision
concluded that "[a] reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is
sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the ESA." Id. at 1065.
72 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (conceding that
imminence is an elastic concept).
73 Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (emphasis omitted).
74 Id.
7 5 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text; see also DOLMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at
40.
As the military undertake [sic] activities in all the waters of the world,
theirpotential encroachment ofcetacean habitats is considerable. Because
public information on the exact nature and extent of military activities is
highly restricted, the total impact of the military's ensonification of the
world's oceans will be difficult to quantify.
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III. INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT
"Although proof of... death of... [an endangered] species... would
be virtually conclusive evidence of a taking, it is not required," or else ESA
would lose its purpose.7 6 "The entire purpose of the ESA is to protect and
recover species before they become extinct. .. ."" A prohibited taking can
be proven under ESA through expert testimony, showing that the activity in
question has caused habitat modification or degradation impacting the ability
of a species to survive.7"
Under ESA section 10, the Secretary of the Interior may permit any
taking that "is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity."79 Since proof of prohibited takings hinges on
sufficiency of evidence, 0 environmentalists have correctly assumed that they
are best served by trying to force the Navy to conduct the full range of
required testing necessary under an incidental take permit."' If environ-
mentalists are able to show that the effects of the LFAS system on
endangered species are more than "incidental," the system will fail the ESA
test and should not be deployed. Requiring the Navy to conduct the necessary
tests under an incidental take permit may provide scientific evidence that
LFAS is killing or at least harming endangered species before the sonar ever
reaches the oceans.
The amount of scientific proof necessary to show imminent harm
resulting from a habitat modification could be compiled rather quickly and
would undoubtedly be accomplished more readily than proving a direct
correlation to internal bleeding and death.82 Knowledge based on testing of
animals to prove imminence of harm and habitat modification can be
acquired through mere isolation and observation, with no need for biological
connections or a true understanding of the effects of LFAS. 3 As previously
discussed, it is imperative that environmentalists delay the planned imple-
76 Vaughan, supra note 30, at 436.
77 Id.
7 1 Id. at 436-37.
7" Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
s Vaughan, supra note 30, at 426.
SI See 7 NAT'LACAD. OF Sci., supra note 12, at app.D.
82 See id. at 436-37.
83 See id. at 435-36. Merely observing a change in eating, breeding, or perhaps swimming
patterns may be enough. See id. at 434.
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mentation of LFAS in eighty percent of the oceans until scientific evidence
can be collected." Otherwise, it will be difficult to isolate the system as the
culprit responsible for the deaths of endangered species."5
Thus far, the Navy has dismissed as inconclusive allegations that whales
are altering behavioral patterns due to sonar.8 6 For example, a single
experiment using bowhead whales produced evidence that "50 percent of
[the] migrating whales observed . .. altered [their] course to [avoid an
underwater] ... transmitter that emitted drilling-type noise."8' The evidence
did not prove harm to the whales because scientists were unable to measure
any long-term effects, or even to determine whether this reaction was a mere
indication of hearing sensitivity. 8 Additionally, the whales were not isolated
and could have been affected by many other variables, including other types
of low frequency ambient sound already present in the ocean. 9
"The levels of low-frequency ambient sound in almost all the world's
oceans are already dominated by anthropogenic sources, primarily shipping
noise. It has been estimated that the background sound level at 100 Hz has
been increasing by about 1.5 dB per decade since the advent of propeller-
driven ships."
To negate the ocean's other variables, an incidental take permit would
require more isolated sound testing by the Navy. In order to receive an
incidental take permit, the Navy was supposed to apply for and complete an
84 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
85 See DOLMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 9.
To ascertain the effects of noise on marine mammals, however, we must
be able to know which sounds they are capable of hearing (something still
largely unknown for the great whales) and how they react to them, if at all.
• . . Practically impossible to discern are changes in population
characteristics, such as birth and death rates, in response to changing noise
levels. Such measures are the best indicators of the population's welfare
and therefore would be vital to obtain before we can be more confident
that, for example, a particular noise source is "harmless" to that
population.... Linking changes in population measures to changes in
noise levels is usually not straightforward, as many other factors (e.g.
oceanographic, ecological, etc.) can affect a population's well-being.
Id.
86 See discussion infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
877 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 12, at app. D.
88 Id.
s9 Id.
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EIS before any development of LFAS.9  The Navy did not support its initial
claims that LFAS was not taking whales with proof or adequate information
about the sonar's effects on wildlife.92 ESA requires the Navy to complete an
EIS in order to demonstrate definitive proof that the system does not harm
animals.93 In addition, a take under ESA "requires a formal consultation with
[the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")] to ensure that the planned
activit[ies] will not [interfere with] the ... existence of the [endangered]
species."94
Because "the Navy is a principal stakeholder in the issue,"' and because
the Navy has the available funds to conduct the necessary testing, forcing the
Navy to apply for an incidental take permit is the environmentalists' best
opportunity for success in halting the implementation of LFAS. The results
from the EIS may provide sufficient information to prove the harm necessary
to stop the deployment.
IV. EIS STATEMENT
By law, the Navy was required to prepare an EIS the moment they
decided to deploy the LFAS system. 96 Yet, "[i]n the period from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, the Navy designed, engineered, manufactured, and
conducted extensive sea tests of the SURTASS 9 LFA system. Estimates of
expenditures during those years are in the range of$ 100 million."' The Navy
was not only illegally developing and testing LFAS, they were also building
a sixty million dollar ship that was to be used to deploy the sonar throughout
the oceans."
The Navy argued that they "sponsored an extensive Scientific Research
Program (SRP) to specifically evaluate any potential effects" prior to the
initial development of LFAS.'" SRP testing did not come close to fulfilling
9" Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1 539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
92 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
9' 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
9" Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 2.0.
9' 7 NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., supra note 12.
9 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (explaining EIS requirements).
9" SURTASS stands for Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System.
9' Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 2.0.
9 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15.
" Id. (quoting a Navy statement).
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the requirements mandated by ESA for an EIS.'' A major flaw in the testing
with regard to the impact of LFAS on whales is that the testing was done "at
an acoustic intensity at least 5,000 times lower than the Navy's planned
deployment levels."10' 2 Additionally, the Navy claims the testing determined
the impact of LFAS on overall stock populations of cetaceans,10 3 but the
testing included only four species of cetaceans for approximately one
month."° This is not enough time to determine the effects of LFAS on stock
populations.'05
Thus, the Navy avoided the application of environmental laws for years,
failing to conduct essential research which might produce information to
explain the effects of LFAS. Instead, the Navy was able to conduct nearly
fifteen years of development without taking the actions required by ESA.'06
Ultimately, the government has invested a substantial amount of money into
the system; the total figure invested is estimated at three hundred and fifty
million dollars, 17 a sum that the government is not readily willing to write
off.
It stands to reason that the Navy was hesitant to apply for an incidental
take permit once funding for the project began. The permits are very difficult
to acquire and EIS testing can take more than a year to process before being
granted.'0 8 The testing is costly in addition to being time consuming. " In this
instance, EIS testing would probably entail elaborate environmental surveys
and observations in addition to the need for acoustic monitoring for the
presence of whales and for determining the impact on them."' The time
'Compare Elizabeth M. Jalley et al. Environmental Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403,486
(2002) (describing the elements of an EIS that are required for applicants to receive a permit
under the ESA), with Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at paras. 7-46 (offering examples
of deficiencies in the Navy's SRP testing).
102 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15.
103 Cetaceans include whales, dolphins, and porpoises. Office of Protected Res., Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., Cetaceans: Whales, Dolphins, andPorpoises, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
prot-res/species/cetaceans/cetaceans.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
104 Letter from Marsha L. Green & Linde Weilgart to Congressional Representatives (Mar.
8, 2001), available at http://www.geocities.com/shootdaguy/commentsfeis/MarshaGreento
Congress.html.
1O5 Id.
See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
107 Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1198 (D. Haw. 2000).
lo 7 NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., supra note 12, at app. D.
109 Id.
110 See id. (describing previous tests conducted by the Navy).
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delays and costs of proper testing are "potentially devastating to a Navy
program" and "has... stopped programs cold... 1 '
Possibly for these reasons, it was not until 1995 that the Navy applied
for an incidental take permit and began EIS testing." 2 It is no coincidence
that the Navy did not begin testing until "a scientist discovered the planned
deployment of the system and alerted the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC)."" 13 NRDC contacted the Navy to challenge the legality of the
development of LFAS without complying with environmental statutes.'14
This pressure caused the Navy to agree to file an EIS before deploying
LFAS. "5 It took an additional three years, however, before the Navy began
the required formal consultation with NMFS to ensure that LFAS would not
endanger whales."' It was not until January of 2001 that the Navy finally
released their final EIS for LFAS."
7
A. The Controversial EIS Testing-The Hawaii Case
Once the EIS process began, Navy scientists conducted tests in two
phases off the coast of California."' In December of 1998, the lead Navy
scientist applied for an amendment to the incidental take permit and wanted
the permit to include testing on humpback and sperm whales off the west
coast of Hawaii.)"9 The amendment to the permit was specifically designed
to test the system during the whale's breeding, birthing, and nursing
season. 20 The Navy failed to consider the "deep bond" that exists between
the people of Hawaii and the humpback whales.' 2 '
Before this testing began, Navy scientists were sent to explain the
testing procedures to the people of Hawaii. 22 Even at the proposed testing
1 Id.
12 Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5.
113 Id.
114 Id.
I Id.
..
6 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 2.0.
" Ocean Mammal Inst., Low Frequency Active Sonar (LEAS) Dates and Events, at
http://www.oceannammalinst.org/lfadates.html (last modified July 18, 2001).
"' Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5.
119Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 3.
122 Id.
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levels, one thousand times weaker than actual deployment levels, the people
of Hawaii were outraged. 2 3 For the islanders, the deliberate injury and
disruption of the protected whale's cycles was not an option. Hawaii's
Congressional Representative, Patsy Mink, found it particularly hypocritical
that a federal agency would invade the waters around Hawaii when the
federal government had just established the National Marine Humpback
Whale Sanctuary in Hawaiian waters. "For a federal agency to come to the
Sanctuary area shortly after the dedication with a permit to harass the very
whales protected appeared to be 'grand hypocrisy .... 2
When the islanders discovered that the Navy had already
spent many years and millions of dollars bringing the
SURTASS LFA system to the deployment stage before
conducting an Environmental Impact Statement... and only
agreed to prepare an EIS after an environmental group caught
the Navy violating numerous environmental laws, the tests
appeared to be little more than window dressing for a
decision already made.
25
The islanders felt that the mere testing of LFAS was so disruptive to the
endangered species that it should have been discontinued immediately since
evidence of harm was clearly apparent.1 26 "On February 23, [1998,] four
environmental organizations filed [a] suit seeking to enjoin any further
testing" near Hawaii until all other phases of EIS testing were completed, but
the court declined to issue the injunction. 27 The Navy was able to begin its
EIS testing over many objections, leading to the prominent case of Hawaii
County Green Party v. Clinton.2 ' The case was filed on March 18, 1998,
following the first few weeks of EIS testing off the coast of Hawaii, and was
one of the first suits to allege actual evidence of adverse effects. 2 9 The suit
alleged nine violations of the mitigation requirements for EIS testing and the
123 Id.
124 Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5 (quoting from a letter from Representative
Patsy Mink to the National Marine Fisheries Service).
125 Id.126 See id.
127 1d. at 4.
12' Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Haw. 2000).
129 See id. at 1180.
930 [Vol. 28:913
THE NAVY AND Low FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR
incidental take permit.'3 ° The mitigation requirements that the Green Party
argues that the Navy was violating read:
Source transmissions shall be suspended immediately if an
acute behavioral response (e.g. repeated/prolonged activity
(vocalizations, breaching, blowing, time on surface, etc.),
potential injurious activity, abnormal number of animals
present or absent in the area, abnormal mother-calf activity,
or erratic swimming behavior of pinnipeds, small cetaceans,
or sea turtles) by a marine mammal or sea turtle [is]
detected. ''
As the issue gained national exposure, many of the islanders began to
observe the results of the testing being conducted by the Navy. The Green
Party filed extensive evidence from whale watch boat captains, fisherman,
and other islanders indicating that the number of whales in the area declined
since the beginning of the testing, and disappeared completely shortly
thereafter.' Additionally, one specific incident occurred in which a baby
humpback whale, out of the presence of its mother, was seen "excessively
breaching, pectoral slapping, tail slapping, and remaining within 100 feet of
shore for hours ....
The Green Party argued that these occurrences satisfied the harm
requirement, and environmentalists were successful in forcing the Navy to
spend for testing they had for so long avoided. But, the Green Party still
lacked evidence to prove causation. 3' The ambiguity of the Court's holding
in the Sweet Home decision"3 left the court with room to decide in favor of
the Navy. The Navy was able to argue that the word "actually" in the Sweet
Home case prevents a charge of "harm that is hypothetical or conjectural, as
opposed to harm that is concrete and particularized.'
' 36
130 Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5.
1I3 Id. (emphasis omitted).
132 Id. at para. 49.
- Id. at para. 65.
134 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n. 13 (1995)
(explaining that causation is requirement of Sweet Home test).
"' See Jensen, supra note 62, at 179. Even though the case- concluded that habitat
modification can be a "take," the ambiguity is what constitutes actual habitat modification.
Id.
136 Id. at 179.
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The Navy's defense again focused on the ocean's other variables that
could have accounted for the change in whale behavior. The Navy attributed
the rapid decline of humpback whales in the area to the beginning of seasonal
migration and to the effects of El Nino.' They argued that the observations
by the plaintiff were "anecdotal and lacking scientific credibility."'138 The
islanders' extensive familiarity with the habits and activities of the whales
could not overcome the Navy's argument for lack of proof, even though the
Navy had no countering data. 139
It seems ironic that the Navy should win on an argument based on a lack
of scientific proof, since EIS testing is supposed to develop knowledge and
scientific proof; yet, the Green Party essentially lost on that very issue. It
would not be until January of 2001 that the Navy finally completed its testing
and released an EIS for LFAS. 140 If the EIS was done correctly, it should
have presented thorough information about the LFAS system and its harmful
effects.
B. Navy's Proposed Final EIS Results: Mere Window Dressing
As a prerequisite to receiving an incidental take permit, the Navy would
be required to submit a habitat conservation plan based on the results of the
completed EIS testing. Three things would be required for each submission.
First, the Navy would have to explain the impact that would likely result
from the taking. Second, the Navy would have to identify steps taken to
minimize the impact. Finally, the Navy would have to disclose any other
alternatives it considered.14 '
1. Explanation of the Impact of Taking
The Navy clearly has never attempted to discern what the impact of the
taking would be on the whales. The Navy has consistently overlooked the
whales' peculiar behaviors and has especially ignored the possibility of any
137 Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5, at para. 50.
138 Id.
"' See id. at paras. 47, 55-56.
140 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 115, at para. 67.
141 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). A fourth consideration
is broad and covers any other measures an issuing agent may consider to be necessary. See
id. at (iv).
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long-term impact. The final EIS only tested LFAS at levels with at least five
thousand times less acoustic intensity and seventy times less pressure than
actual operational levels. 142 "Consequently, we know virtually nothing about
what impact the higher, deployment level sonar will have on marine life and
humans over the long term."'
43
Additionally, even at the lower LFAS test levels, humpback whales
demonstrated altered behavioral patterns. " Whales were seen both leaving
the testing area and changing the length of their songs.145 Yet, the Navy
disregarded these behavioral changes, never satisfactorily examining the cause
of these changes. 46 The issue again is whether the changes in behavioral
patterns qualifies as a taking.
Because the Navy did not follow the guidelines for completion of an
EIS, it remains impossible to determine the true scientific impact of LFAS
and whether it causes the changes in song or the whales' fleeing from the
areas. All of the conclusions to be drawn from the changes in whales' songs
are still speculative because the Navy has either ignored or dismissed the
behaviors as "biologically insignificant" in its EIS reports. 47 A more
detailed examination of the changes in songs helps to illustrate scientists'
lack of understanding of humpback whales and illustrates how the Navy
failed to thoroughly complete the EIS testing.
Male humpback whales are known to sing complex songs during the
mating season. 14 Scientists believe that these songs are sexual displays.'49 In
June of 2000, scientists hired by the Navy described the results of the 1998
testing of humpback whales off the coast of Hawaii. 5 ' The whale songs were
twenty-nine percent longer when LFAS was being broadcast at lower rates
than would be used when the LFAS system is fully implemented. 5 ' The
142 Ocean Mammal Inst., Why the Navy's Conclusions About the Safety of LFAS Are
Scientifically Flawed, at para. 3, at http://www.oceannammalinst.org/navyconclusions
flawed.htm (last updated Apr. 5, 2001).
Id. at para. 6.
44Id. at para. 4.
145 Id.
146 See id.
147 Id.
' Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at para. 56.
149 Id.
150 Id.
Is' Id.
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scientists suggested that the longer songs were to compensate for the acoustic
interference. 52
This evidence demonstrates just how little is known about whales'
vocalizations and, in particular, the effects of sonar on them. Scientists
hypothesize that the songs are sexual displays, but then do no more than
recognize that the songs have become longer. Little is known about what, if
any, effects the "increased energy expenditure might have on long term
reproductive rates." '153 Had the Navy conducted full EIS reports, it would
have been required to research and study these effects before developing the
LFAS system. Additionally, environmentalists argue that the Navy's research
has only analyzed conventional direct effects on hearing, while ignoring the
possibility that whale strandings or injuries could result from other effects of
the sonar not related to hearing. 154 For instance, the Navy has never addressed
the possible effects of direct transmission of acoustic energy into bodily
tissue and resonant cavities occurring when bodies are submerged in water.'55
"In air, 99.97% of acoustic energy is reflected from the body. In water,
however, there's no reflection or reduction of energy because the body is
mostly water. Therefore, 100% of acoustic energy goes into the body in
water."' 56 Many scientists believe that this effect may cause tissue rupture
and hemorrhaging in various organs; yet, the Navy has failed to satisfactorily
address the issue.'
152 Id.
153 Id.
54 Letter from Green & Weilgart, supra note 104, at para. 5.
155 Id.
156 Id.
151 See id. at para. 6. In the Navy's Technical Report 3, accompanying its draft EIS, it was
reported that soft tissue damage and liver hemorrhage would be likely at an exposure level
of about 184 dB. Id. (citing TECHNICAL REPORT 3: SUMMARY REPORT ON THE BIO-EFFECTS
OF Low FREQUENCY WATER BORNE SOUND (E. Cudahy et. al. eds., 1999) (unpublished
report on file with Dept. of the Navy), in 1 DEPT. OF NAVY, FINAL OVERSEAS
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
SURVEILLANCE TOWED ARRAY SENSOR SYSTEM LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE (SURTASS LFA)
SONAR incorporated by reference). The Navy failed to examine whether lower decibel levels
would cause resonance or vestibular effects in the whales resulting in panic and stranding.
Id.
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2. Steps Taken to Minimize the Impact of LFAS
The EIS reports fail to identify the steps taken by the Navy to minimize
the impact of LFAS. The Navy simply tries to deny any impact, ignore the
whales' behavioral changes, or conclude the behavioral changes are
insignificant. Environmentalists claim, however, that accepted research exists
demonstrating that whales change their behavior in an attempt to avoid sonar
at 115-120 dB.' s This is only half the level that the active sonar produced by
the LFAS system can reach." 9 Rather than try to minimize the impact of
LFAS, the Navy has done the opposite by repeatedly arguing that the
scientifically accepted level at which whales change behavior is too low."6
If the Navy were to successfully increase this accepted level, most of the
environmentalists' protests would lose merit because LFAS would then fall
within accepted levels of sound. Since the EIS statements, however, are
incomplete in regards to scientific evidence, the Navy similarly will have a
difficult time finding adequate proof that a higher level of decibels for its
sonar is acceptable.
3. Proposed Alternatives
Lastly, the Navy has failed to list and explain alternative technology and
seems unwilling to terminate the LFAS project for a system using less active
sonar. There is evidence that the Navy has developed passive sonar systems
that are also able to detect silent submarines. 6' Not only is this passive sonar
better for the endangered marine life, but the use of the "equipment has also
resulted in substantially reduced costs with no reduction in fielded
'58 See MARSHA GREEN, LET'S END THE VIOLENCE AGAINST MARINE LIFE, at
http://www.oceanmanmalinst.org/int/berlintalk.html (last visited Feb. 27,2004) ("[W]hales
swim 2 to 3 times faster away from boats whose engines reach the level of 120 dB. The
source level of LFAS at 240 dB is one trillion times louder than the 120 dB level whales
avoid.").
159 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 2, at para. 3. The active sonar is produced by
massive speakers that produce sounds as loud as 240 decibels. Id.
160 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at para. 8.
.6. Id. at paras. 9-12; Navy Submarine Force Structure and Modernization Plans: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Military Procurement of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
106th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2000) (citing statements of Rear Admiral Malcolm I. Fages, U.S.
Navy Director, Submarine Warfare Division and Rear Admiral John P. Davis, U.S. Navy
Program Executive Office for Submarines).
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capability."' 162 This alternative appears to be ideal from the environmental
standpoint, since the Navy can simultaneously protect the security of the
nation while also protecting the endangered species of our seas)63
Unfortunately, the Navy did not address this alternative in the EIS statement
and is reluctant to write off all the money previously invested in LFAS.
Because of this alternative, an incidental take permit should not have been
granted because there seems to be an available alternative to accommodate
the species. 64
C. Difficulty with Arguing Invalid EIS
As knowledge about the underlying effects of LFAS on marine life does
not exist, at least outside of confidential Navy materials, environmentalists
have little evidence with which to refute the EIS, regardless of the procedures
followed by the Navy or the level of active sonar implemented in the testing.
Because the answers are still outside current non-military scientific capacity,
it is nearly impossible to "base reasonable strategies for ensuring that these
laws are not violated and that marine life is protected .... ,165 Ultimately, a
conclusion that EIS testing did not produce a valid Habitat Conservation Plan
would be either arbitrary or based on incomplete and inaccurate infor-
mation.'" Nonetheless, steps could have been taken to limit the arbitrariness
of the findings.
Perhaps the easiest step to ensure a fair analysis of the data would be to
consult neutral scientists, not paid by the Navy, with differing opinions and
ideas. 67 The reports from independent research teams during the testing off
the coast of Hawaii were completely ignored by the Navy and NMFS.
68
These reports cited abnormal behaviors among whales, but the Navy either
'
62 Id. at para. 12.
'
63 Id. at para. 13.
'"Vaughan, supra note 30, at 438.
165 7 NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., supra note 12, at para. 7 (discussing the laws that must be
followed when completing an EIS).
166Id.
167 "All the Navy's LFAS tests were conducted by scientists paid by the Navy.... There was
no testing done by independent marine biologists." Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at
paras. 14-15.
168 Id. at para. 16. "The Ocean Mammal Institute (OMI) sent an experienced research team
to observe the LFAS test area in Hawaii in March 1998." Id.
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ignored or failed to record the events. For example, a research team from
Ocean Mammal Institute ("OMr') conducted its own observational testing
and documented an abandoned humpback calf showing agitated behavior. 69
"This calf breached (jumped out of the water) a total of 230 times during a
four-hour time frame. The calf also slapped its pectoral fin on the water 671
times during this same observation period."'7 0 Had the Navy listened to or
consulted with this independent testing team, the LFAS testing would have
been required to stop since the testing permit application clearly stated that
testing would be suspended if an animal is observed with significant
behavioral modifications. 7' A second step would have been to require the
use of more comparable acoustic levels. Findings may have been more
conclusive had the Navy used the higher acoustic levels of LFAS. Since the
tests used were five thousand times less acoustically intense than the planned
deployment,'72 it is difficult to conclude that the same indeterminate results
would occur at full implementation levels. Even the scientists the Navy hired
asserted that it would be difficult to extrapolate from the results at lower
levels to predict responses at higher exposure levels. 73
A third simple step would be the requirement of alternatives in the
Navy's Habitat Conservation Plan. Without alternatives, an incidental take
permit should not be issued because the Habitat Conservation Plan clearly
requires the applying Agency to explore alternatives. Once alternatives are
provided, they may bring to light more efficient and friendly options. 74 Yet,
169 Id.
' Id. at para. 20. During a breach, the whale generates upward force with its flukes to propel
its body two-thirds of the way out of the water. EMILY GARDNER, EARTHTRUST, Humpback
Whales § II, in HAWAII'S MARINE WILDLIFE: WHALES, DOLPHINS, TURTLES AND SEALS: A
COURSE OF STUDY, at http://www.earthtrust.org/wlcurric/whales.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2004). The whale may also twist its body at the height of the breach. Id. It should be noted
that researchers believe that breaching is usually related to courtship or play activity. Id.
171 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at para. 22. The mitigation requirements read:
Source transmissions shall be suspended immediately if an acute
behavioral response (e.g. repeated/prolonged activity (vocalizations,
breaching, blowing, time on surface, etc.), potential injurious activity,
abnormal number of animals present or absent in the area, abnormal
mother-calf activity, or erratic swimming behavior of pinnipeds, small
cetaceans, or sea turtles) by a marine mammal or sea turtle [is] detected.
Sinkin, Facts and Policy Issues, supra note 5, at para. 44 (emphasis ommitted).
172 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at para. 3.
'Id. at para. 45.
"7 Vaughan, supra note 30, at 438.
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the Navy clearly has not taken the necessary actions to improve alternative
habitats, "so that the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species as a
whole is not appreciably reduced." ' The Navy simply continues to argue
that no harm results from LFAS.
If the EIS findings were sufficiently conclusive to find a taking, and an
incidental take permit was not an option because alternatives were never
explored, the project could be stopped immediately. At a minimum, a more
thorough EIS would have erased some of the questions stemming from the
use of LFAS and eliminated a portion of the arbitrary findings. Perhaps
because the Navy was aware of this, it failed to follow the guidelines of the
EIS and left many options unexplored. "The OEIS/EIS written to justify this
action is a masterful piece of misdirection, obfuscation, and even deception
requiring private citizens to spend interminable hours determining what is
actually being said."' 76 The Navy appears to have written the EIS merely to
quiet the mounting pressure from environmentalists on the Navy and
Congress; in actuality, it provided very little new information at all.
D. Importance of Forcing Navy to Complete a More Thorough EIS
The Navy has admitted that data gaps resulting from a lack of
information about sonar have necessitated the use of various models to
provide a rational basis for assessment of potential risk. 77 There does not
appear to be any data that conclusively resolves the issue of the scientific
feasibility of LFAS, because the Navy has refused to continue testing on the
grounds of a "perceived urgent national security need."' 8 "The OEIS/EIS
does its best to suppress or obscure the truth. Nevertheless, the truth pops out
in ways that demonstrate the conflicted nature of those preparing the
document."'79
If the incidental take permit in ESA is to fulfill its ultimate purpose, the
Navy should have been denied the right to implement LFAS because the
three steps for a valid habitat conservation plan have not been satisfied; 8 ° at
a minimum it should ensure that the Navy explains the likely impact that
175 Id.
176 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 5.0.
177Id. § 2.0.
178 Id.
179 Id. § 3.4.
"o See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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would result from the testing. Ultimately, if the Navy has knowledge and
information about LFAS effects, environmentalists would force the
distribution of information for other agencies to use in further scientific
testing. Conversely, if the information still does not exist, an effective
incidental take permit would require the Navy to conduct further scientific
testing to get the answers about potential effects on the endangered whales.
The pressure by environmentalists to force a truly accurate EIS statement is
of utmost importance in either instance.
The lack of supplied information and alternatives from the Navy in their
"final" EIS statement creates a difficult situation for NMFS. "If the inade-
quacies of the OEIS/EIS are significant, NvFIS cannot rely upon that
document for its decision-making."'"' Thus, by forcing the production of a
more thorough EIS, environmentalists may be able to pressure the Navy into
conducting tests they have otherwise refused to perform.
E. Other Hurdles
1. Would Any Group Have Sufficient Standing?
A federal court will grant summary judgment if the parties "show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' 2 Ultimately, the burden of proof
is on the party that brings the suit to trial.' 3 Environmentalists fighting
against the implementation of LFAS will therefore have to establish that the
harm is adversely affecting them in order to establish sufficient standing.
In Coho Salmon v. Pacific Lumber Co., the court allowed the
plaintiffs to file suit and avoid summary judgment because the plaintiffs
showed "specific facts" to support their case."8 5 The Supreme Court had
established that "the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,'
but must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts' ... which
for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true."'8 6
The plaintiffs in Coho Salmon were non-profit organizations trying to protect
18, Id. § 3.0.
182 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
183 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
's' Coho Salmon v. Pacific Lumber Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
'
83 Id. at 1011.
'
86 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).
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and conserve the wild coho salmon'87 and their habitat.' The Court granted
standing to the plaintiffs because they were able to prove that their aesthetic
and recreational enjoyment had been threatened.' 89 "[T]he'injury in fact' test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured."'9 Any member of an
environmentalist group or organization is required, therefore, to show injury
to himself and to every party in the suit.
If environmentalists can demonstrate that the whales might be harmed
by LFAS, environmental groups should be able to bring suit against the
Navy, under the holding of Coho Salmon, because whale-watching has
become a national recreational activity. 1' Because the key requirement for
the purpose of standing "is that the plaintiff have suffered his injury in a
personal and individual way,"' 92 an environmentalist bringing suit should be
able to meet this requirement by arguing that the aesthetic value of whale-
watching has been damaged. This is especially true because whale-watching
has developed great economic value for many companies that conduct
expeditions for recreational purposes.' Thus, standing, under the citizen
proof provision of ESA, should be approved readily by the court.
Although whales have become a recreational attraction and have
brought national attention to the issue of LFAS, other endangered species
may also be negatively affected by LFAS. Without the aesthetic value
argument, plaintiffs wishing to protect these animals will have a more
difficult time obtaining standing. Environmental groups may be forced to
plead a case on behalf of the animals, employing the legal fiction that the
animals themselves are bringing the charge. "Some courts have permitted
suits to go forward under the citizen suit provisions of the ESA with fish and
87 Coho Salmon was listed as threatened on November 20, 1996. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 at n.598 (2002).
18 Coho Salmon, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
189 Id. at 1014-15.
190 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)).
191 See GARDNER, supra note 170, §III (D). "[T]he whale-watch industry draws almost one
million visitors to Hawaii each year, resulting in tourist income for the state of more than 80
million dollars annually." Id.
192 Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
93 See Howard Dicus, Whale-Watching Industry Predicts Heavy Traffic, PAC. Bus. NEWS,
Dec. 10, 2001, available at http://pacific.bizjoumals.com/pacific/stories/2001/l2/1 O/small
b3.html. "Whale-watching companies charge between $22 and $30 for excursions... ." Id.
at para. 5.
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wildlife species as the named plaintiffs even though the definition of 'person'
under section 1532(13) does not include fish or wildlife species."' 19 4
Courts are divided on whether the endangered species, itself, can be the
plaintiff.195 The contention is that fish and wildlife are able to receive
standing because section 1540(g) of ESA allows any person to bring suit on
his behalf, and the term "person" includes "any other entity subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States."' 96 Although the court in Coho Salmon did
not conclusively decide the issue, the court suggested that it would be
difficult for an endangered species to obtain standing for itself. "Without
delving into the vagaries of the term 'entity,' the court notes that, to swim its
way into federal court in this action, the coho salmon would have to battle a
strong current and leap barriers greater than a waterfall or the occasional
fallen tree.' 97
2. Exemption Through Section 7 of ESA: "God Squad"
In spite of the provisions that have been violated, it is important to note
that ESA provides an opportunity for programs to survive even if they are
harmful to an endangered species. Section 7 of ESA' 98 provides an exemption
procedure that allows activities to proceed even if it places a listed species
in jeopardy.' 99 This procedure is set in motion by the Endangered Species
Committee, commonly known as the "God Squad."' This subcommittee has
been called together very rarely since the subsection was added to ESA in
1978.201 Only once has the exemption been fully granted.
202
'9 Coho Salmon v. Pacific Lumber Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1008 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
9 See id. for examples of divided cases.
196 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(13), 1540(g)(1) (2000).
197 Coho Salmon, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 n.2.
198 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (2000) (providing the rules for an exemption).
'9 Vaughan, supra note 30 at 426. An exemption may be granted for LFAS, but it would not
be an exemption permitting the harm of the endangered whales. See EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. ORDER CODE 1B10072, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS,
ENDANGERED SPECIES: DIFFICULT CHOICES, at CRS-3 (Dec. 9, 2003), available at
http://resources.committee.house.gov/Press/reports/esa/esachoices crs.pdf("Proponents of
federal action may apply for an exemption from § 7(a)(2) of the ESA for that action (not for
a species).").2
00 BUCK ET AL., supra note 199, at CRS-3.
201 Id.
202 Id. The exemption was granted in a case where the State of Nebraska and
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In order for an exemption to be granted, five out of the six specified
federal officials on the God Squad must vote positively to allow future harm
of a species."0 3 This exemption process is very time-consuming, and, as
already seen by the avoidance of EIS procedures, the Navy is adverse to
time-consuming procedures. Perhaps for this reason, the Navy once again
avoided a valid procedure for implementation of the new technology under
ESA and decided instead to bypass ESA and apply for an exemption based
on national security.
3. National Security: United States Navy Granted an Exemption for
Five Years
After over twenty years of development and following years of excuses
for ESA "oversights," the Navy turned to one of its most unassailable
strategies by applying for an exemption based upon national security.2" This
last option taken by the Navy to bypass ESA guidelines and essentially strip
ESA's authority, effectively demonstrates that ESA is not applicable to the
United States military. Ultimately, if granted an exemption for national
protection, it will be virtually impossible to restrict the Navy's right to
implement LFAS throughout the world's oceans." 5
Proponents of any federal action are allowed to apply for an exemption
to the Endangered Species Act. 206 ESA allows the Department of
Commerce20 7 to grant exceptions for certain actions that would otherwise be
in violation of its terms. 2 8 Nonetheless, if LFAS is not needed for national
environmentalists were trying to stop construction of the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir on
the Laramie River in Wyoming because of the harm it was posing to the whooping crane.
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336, 1338 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1994). The
reservoir was being designed to supply water to the Missouri Basin Power Project. Id. The
settlement agreement and establishment of a Trust, allowed an exemption to be granted. Id.
at 1138 n.1.
203 BUCK ET AL., supra note 199, at CRS-3.
204 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 4.1.
205 Even the God Squad must grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense determines that
it is needed for national defense and security. BUCK ET AL., supra note 199, at CRS-10.206 Id. at CRS-3.
207 "The DOI [Department of Interior] is responsible for all terrestrial species, while the
Department of Commerce is responsible for marine species." Jalley, supra note 101, at 484
(citation omitted).
208 Id. at 486.
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protection, the Navy should still be subject to ESA, because ESA has
established that any person, including a government agency, is not allowed
to engage in a taking.2
The Navy argues that a "submarine challenge triangle" exists consisting
of Russia, China, and other "countries of concern," including Iran and North
Korea.2 10 The belief is that although the total number of submarines in the
world has declined, the quality of new submarines is vastly improving.21' As
a result, the Navy purports to require continual intensified development of
our country's sonar system, as other nations' submarines have become more
and more technologically advanced. 12 The Navy anticipates "that over the
next several decades, the proliferation of quiet, capable, and effective
submarines through foreign sales and indigenous manufacture will result in
even more reliance on active acoustics ....
Opponents argue that as we enter the twenty-first century, most of the
United States' present enemies do not have a sophisticated Navy with
technologically advanced submarines.2t A study performed by Forecast
International even speculated a decline from a 2001 submarine sales
assessment of $70 billion over the next ten years to $60.5 billion for Middle
Eastern countries.21 5 The study also anticipates that "only three submarine
producers will stay in the market leaving fewer options for countries seeking
diesel-electric submarines. 21 6
2 Mausolfv. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998).
210 Worldwide Submarine Challenges: Hearing on S. Res. 450 Before the Subcomm. On Sea
Power of the Comm. on Armed Servs., 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997) (statement of Rear
Admiral Michael W. Cramer, Dir. of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/s970408c.htm.211 Id. at para. 3.
212 See generally id. (discussing the strategic increase of submarines within the submarine
challenge triangle).
2117 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 12, at app. D, para. 13.
214 See, e.g., Lauren Bemis, The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Middle
Eastern Submarine Fleets Modernize Swiftly: 'Wine Dark Seas' Quickly Becoming More
Dangerous, JINSA ONLINE, June 28, 2002, at para. 1, at http://www.jinsa.orglarticles/
articles.htm/function/view/categoryid/154/documentid/1513/. "The vast majority ofMiddle
Eastern submarines operated by navies, acquired in the 1970s, are facing obsolescence, and
countries from Egypt to Iran are in the process of upgrading their submarine fleets." Id. at
para. 7. In fact, currently Turkey has the largest submarine fleet in the entire Middle East
with only fifteen submarines. Id.
2 1Id. at para. 15.
216 Id.
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In addition, although there have been recent altercations with China,
relations between the two countries are far from hostile. Our Navy has spent
millions on "super silent" submarines with non-cavitating propulsive blades
and quiet engines;2 17 these submarines are not essential for national security
reasons. There are no immediate threats or concerns of submarine-related
activities, providing ample time for the Navy to test LFAS, and time to find
safer alternatives if such tests demonstrate LFAS harms marine life.
Although there is no indication of threats by submarine warfare, NMFS
granted the Navy a five-year exemption from the Marine Mammal Protection
Act in the summer of 2002.218 By granting this exemption, ESA's influence
and authority has been eviscerated. The minor restrictions placed upon the
Navy by the Bush administration are a far cry from the requirements of an
EIS report. The Navy is only required to restrict the sonar's routine use to at
least twelve nautical miles and must visually scan for endangered marine
mammals and sea turtles, shutting down the system whenever detected.1 9
The effects on endangered species that are out of sight or further than twelve
nautical miles away are not even addressed.
Perhaps ESA's forms and completion guidelines for EIS reports are
partially to blame. EIS documents themselves do not include terms of
procedure in times of threat or warfare, apparently implying that in time of
threat or warfare, destruction of the environment is acceptable.220 The EIS
completed by the Navy specifically excludes any evaluation of environ-
mental impacts in times of threat and warfare.22' Additionally, NMFS'
statutory powers include the right to decline to make a decision regarding the
deployment until the Navy evaluates the full range of the effects of LFAS,
including effects during times of warfare.222 Although the NMFS still should
have been able to stop the deployment prior to a claim of national security by
the Navy, "[t]he current willingness of NMFS to waive the mitigation
requirements when inconvenient to Navy training and look the other way in
27 Greenpeace Found. Campaign, supra note 4, at para. 15.
2'8 Kenneth R. Weiss & Tony Perry, The Nation: Navy Use of Sonar OKd Despite Risk to
Whales; Military: Some Scientists Say Safety Features in the Submarine-Detection System
Aren't Enough, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al.
219 Id.
220 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 3.1.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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case of threat or warfare conditions continues the erosion of confidence in
regulatory vigor."2"3
It is unfortunate that the Bush administration has decided to grant the
exemption. "Until such time as national security is defined to include a
healthy and vital environment, people outside the national security
establishment will continue to face the false dichotomy of national security
versus environmental protection. ' 224 LFAS "is an excellent example of a
narrow-minded, national security pursuit of a militarily-defined goal that
failed to recognize, ignored, or deliberately avoided the environmental
implications of the proposed action." '25 This suggests that the Navy considers
itself to be above the law.
2 26
4. International Ramifications/Problems with Enforcement
Global extinction rates continue to rise in spite of an increased global
awareness of the types of conservation programs needed to sustain
endangered fish and wildlife.227 As the human population grows,221 people are
developing more land, consuming more food and water at the expense of
plants and animals, and invading more space for recreation.229 The changes
in human use of the world's oceans over the past century have created a
cacophony of underwater noise pollution.230 Yet, when the initial testing of
the LFAS system began in the early 1980s, the Navy first took the position
that an incidental take permit and EIS testing was not necessary.23' The Navy
argued that because the testing was being done in foreign waters it did not
have to follow ESA laws.232 The Navy indicated that ESA did not apply
within the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of foreign nations, but ESA
223 Id. § 4.1.6.6.
224 ld. § 1.0.
25 Id.
226 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 1.0.
" Jensen, supra note 62, at 169-70.
228 "The human population is growing at an exponential rate and is expected to double in size
half-way through the next century." Id. at 169.
229 See id. "[H]uman activities account for the rarity of sixty-eight percent of the birds and
eighty-six percent of the mammals [considered rare or endangered] .... Id. at 170.
230 McCarthy, supra note 3, at 265-66.
231 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 2.0.
232 Ifd.
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does apply unless within three-mile limits of the foreign coast.23s The fact
that the Navy felt it could avoid ESA guidelines by simply moving locations
stirred so much outrage from environmentalists that it persuaded the Green
Party234 to file a supplemental motion to reopen their 1998 case.
235
Today, many groups are urging that sonar and other ocean noise be
classified as a transboundary pollutant. 236 "Because acoustic emissions
involve the introduction of energy into the marine environment and may
involve deleterious effects to marine mammals, noise can clearly be
considered pollution under UNCLOS [the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea] ."237 The problem is that transboundary pollution laws do not
yet fully address environmental problems irrespective of international legal
boundaries.23 Because ecological effects know no boundaries and can easily
spill across international lines,239 it should be a major concern of the nations
233 Id.
234 The Green Party is an environmental activist organization. See Hawaii County Green
Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1179 (D. Haw. 2000).
235 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at para. 25.
23 6 McCarthy, supra note 3, at 259. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea ("UNCLOS") defines marine pollution as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities.
Id. (quoting United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 1(l)(4),
21 I.L.M 1261, 1271 (1982)) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
23' Id. at 259. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 236 (defining marine pollution as
introduction of energy into the marine environment with the likely result of causing
deleterious effects). One of the main topics addressed by UNCLOS is the protection of the
marine environment. The convention addresses six main sources of ocean pollution, one of
which is vessel-source pollution. Id. "With regard to marine pollution from foreign vessels,
coastal States can exercise jurisdiction only for the enforcement of laws and regulations
adopted in accordance with the Convention for 'generally accepted international mles and
standards."' Oceans & Law of the Sea, United Nations, The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention agreements/conventionhistoricalperspective.htm.
238 Id. at 260.
39 McCarthy, supra note 3, at 258 (citing Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A.
1905, 1965 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941) (describing the case as
the only international adjudication on the subject of air pollution)).
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of the world to design treaties to limit ocean noise pollution. Unfortunately,
currently there is a lack of coherent policy' 4° and "no international treaties or
laws that specifically address the operations of sonars ... in territorial waters
or the high seas."24'
Although many international instruments state that nations "have an
implied duty and a due diligence obligation" to the environment in ensuring
that new technology and products do not cause any harm,24' by implementing
and testing LFAS off foreign coasts, the United States appears to put its
rights above the rights of others.243 "Secretary of State Colin Powell has
begun enunciating a theory of American exceptionalism that pretty much
says the United States can do as it pleases. It is so superior to other nations
that it need not be bound by the rules of international behavior that bind other
nations."2"
V. CONCLUSION
"The language of ESA 'indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."'2 45 Congress'
intent obviously was to prevent extinctions at any cost.2" ESA even provides
the federal government with a "mandatory duty" to use all methods available
to protect an endangered species. 47 Yet, the authority and weight the
government actually gives ESA is minimal.
240 For a list of international instruments of actual or potential relevance to protection of
cetaceans from ocean noise, treaties underlying regional sea initiatives, and selected
provisions of regional seas treaties, see DOLMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 124-30.
141 Id. at 260.
242 Id. at 287.
243 "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." Id. at 288 (quoting Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, princ.
15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I)(1992)).
2 Sinkin, Comments on NMFS Rule, supra note 1, § 1.0 (quoting from an editorial in the
Minneapolis Star Tribune republished in the Hawaii Tribune-Herald on Feb. 13, 2001).
245 Vaughan, supra note 30, at 427 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
173 (1978).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 427-28.
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The decisions that have accompanied the development of the LFAS
system for the last twenty years have consistently ignored both ESA's
guidelines and the environment as a whole. Each time environmentalists have
presented information about the harmful effects of the LFAS system, the
Navy has found another way to evade the realities of the damages. The
bumps and hurdles are vast, and it is apparent that the government is
unwilling to terminate the entire project or find alternative measures because
of the funds already invested. The scientific knowledge about the effect of
sonar on whales and other endangered species is still too inconclusive to
force a change in Navy procedures.
It is more than coincidental that, although the testing conducted by the
Navy has repeatedly failed to meet ESA's standards, the Navy remains,
singularly, in a position to address the issue of sonar in our oceans.248 The
more than twenty years of testing have left them in sole possession of the
amount and quality of information needed to determine the impact of this
operation on endangered marine species.249
[T]he current structure of marine mammal science in the US,
where Navy and other defense related agencies fund a large
proportion of medium-large projects (especially those
involving underwater acoustics) effectively restricts academic
freedom.... [sic] it is disturbing when any agency with a
principal mandate unrelated to science funds a large
proportion of the research in any field.250
ESA's purpose, "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
248 7 NAT'LACAD. OF SCI., supra note 12, at app. D, para. 19. In fact, the Navy began testing
the use of sonar by marine mammals in the early 1960s, and has had a marine mammal
program in place since 1960. See PuB. BROAD. SERV., A WHALE OF A BusINEss: THE STORY
OF NAvY DOLPHINS (1998), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/whales/
etc/navycron.html. The program's intent was to study the sonar capabilities of dolphins and
beluga whales, in attempting to develop more efficient method of detecting objects
underwater. Id.
249 7 NAT'LACAD. OF SCI., supra note 12, at app. D para. 19.
250 Ocean Mammal Inst., supra note 15, at n. 16 (quoting H. Whitehead & Lindy Weilgart,
Marine Mammal Science, The US Navy andAcademic Freedom, 11 MARINE MAMMAL SCI.
260, 263 (1995)).
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conserved," '5 seems to no longer be a priority of our government. If the last
twenty years has proven anything, it is that ESA lacks the equitable weight
that Congress initially desired it provide. The conflict between economic
interests and the increasing pressures on our natural resources as the earth
rapidly runs out of open space is only growing. The time has come to
examine the Endangered Species Act and enact legislation that will protect
endangered species from the power of an ever-changing global dynamic.
" Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
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